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Do Independent Directors Tell
the Truth, the Whole Truth,
and Nothing but the Truth
When They Resign?
Keren Bar-Hava1, Sterling Huang2,
Benjamin Segal1,3, and Dan Segal4
Abstract
We examine the informativeness and credibility of independent directors’ stated resignation
reasons. We posit that having access to private information, directors may resign in antici-
pation of weak future underperformance to limit damage to their reputation and further
have an incentive to mask the reason for the resignation. Results show likelihood of resig-
nation increases with director’s reputation and weak future firm performance. In addition,
the evidence is consistent with directors obfuscating the reason for departure by providing
benign and unverifiable resignation reasons. Investors seem aware of the disclosure incen-
tives of departing directors and react negatively to such resignations. However, investors,
by and large, underreact to the resignation announcement, likely because of the benign
reason given for the resignation. Our results suggest that notwithstanding the perception of
outside directors’ impartiality and assumed interest alignment with shareholders, indepen-
dent directors’ personal reputation concerns may conflict with the interests of sharehold-
ers to whom they owe fiduciary duties.
Keywords
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Introduction
The importance of board independence to the monitoring of the firm is well recognized in
the literature and by regulators. By and large, there is strong evidence that strengthening of
the board independence is associated with a more effective board oversight function. This
is because independent directors are assumed to be less beholden to the CEO, and to add
expertise and new perspectives to boards that might otherwise lack diversity.
Notwithstanding the presumption that directors’ serve the interests of shareholders, there is
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growing evidence of divergence between directors’ and shareholders’ interests. Directors’
actions that are motivated by personal reputational concerns, may maximize their interests
at the expense of shareholders (e.g., Asthana & Balsam, 2009; Fahlenbrach, Low, & Stulz,
2010; Gupta & Fields, 2009).
Directorships bring many benefits to the individual in terms of business connections,
reputation, and compensation (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Linn & Park, 2005; Lorsch &
MacIver, 1989; Perry, 2000; Yermack, 2004). A resignation signals that the ‘‘cost’’ of ser-
ving on a board exceeds the benefits. The cost includes primarily the time commitment and
the risk to the director’s reputation—the labor market perception of a director’s ability,
skill, or experience. Preservation or enhancement of reputation in the labor market is con-
sidered a primary motivation of directors (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Masulis &
Mobbs, 2014).
Directors are privy to inside information about the firm and may predict future outcomes
better. Thus, directors may resign when they anticipate future underperformance to limit
potential damage to their reputation. This study highlights the contrast between the percep-
tion of outside directors’ impartiality and assumed interest alignment with shareholders and
the potential divergence in the self-interest of those directors when reputational concerns
are high, by examining the informativeness and credibility of independent directors’ cited
reasons for resignation. We posit that reputation concerns can make independent directors’
interest diverge from that of shareholders. We test the hypothesis by examining the circum-
stances surrounding independent directors’ departures and the informativeness and credibil-
ity of the reasons cited for resignation as the setting for testing this hypothesis.1
Given directors’ central role in monitoring and advising management, the disclosure of
the motive for directors’ resignation, especially if it is related to concerns about future per-
formance, contains important information for investors, allowing shareholders to react in a
timely manner. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) supports this view, stating
that as with the change in independent accountants
. . . the Commission noted that disclosures concerning the resignation of a director may be of
similar importance in bringing to light disagreements or difficulties concerning management
policies or practices that may be material to an investment decision with regard to the regis-
trant’s securities.
Hence, the SEC put in place director resignation disclosure requirements that depend on
director discretion. Theory suggests agents will disclose their private information to miti-
gate hidden-information or adverse selection problems (Grossman, 1981). However, when
costs are introduced into the model, agents may not always have an incentive to disclose
bad news (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010; Muslu, Radhakrishnan, Subramanyam, &
Lim, 2015). Departing directors have an incentive to disguise the true reason for their
departure when their resignation is due to concerns about future performance. Attributing
the departure to concerns about future performance or citing ‘‘disagreement’’ with manage-
ment relating to the company’s operations, policies, or practices would have no apparent
benefit for the departing director. First, conveying the true reason for the departure would
likely trigger an immediate negative market reaction (Agrawal & Chen, 2017; Dewally &
Peck, 2009), which would adversely affect the financial position of the departing director,
as well as that of management and the remaining directors. Second, it would likely increase
public scrutiny of both the board and management, and might open the door to shareholder
intervention and even litigation—consequences that could undermine the departing
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director’s relationship with management and the remaining directors, and result in the
director being perceived as a ‘‘trouble maker.’’ Indeed, dissenting directors experience a
decline in the number of board appointments they are offered in the future (Marshall,
2010). Hence, directors have incentive to disguise the true motive for resignation by citing
benign or ambiguous motives such as ‘‘time constraints’’ and ‘‘personal reasons,’’ or by
not providing an explanation at all.
We examine the information content of the reason for the resignation in two steps. First,
while the evidence in the literature is consistent with a greater likelihood of director resig-
nation both following and in anticipation of weak operating and financial performance, it
does not allow us to determine whether reputation concerns actually play a role in the deci-
sion to resign when directors anticipate poor future performance. Our first set of analyses
shows that director departures are motivated by the preservation of reputational capital in
anticipation of poor firm performance.2 This result supports the conjecture that reputation
concerns affect directors’ resignation decisions, especially when they anticipate poor future
performance.
Second, to facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the resignation announcements and
their informativeness, we use data from Audit Analytics to identify all resignation cases
from 2004 through 2012. We group the reasons for departure into four mutually exclusive
categories. The first category, ‘‘Disagreement,’’ includes all resignations where the outside
director specifically cites (or the company is aware of) a disagreement with management
on a matter relating to the company’s operations, policies, or practices. It thus includes
cases where the resignation provides a strong signal that the director has concerns about
the future performance of the firm. The second category, accounting for over 60% of the
sample, is ‘‘No Reason.’’ The third category is ‘‘Outside Commitments.’’ The fourth is
‘‘Personal,’’ where the stated reason for departure is related to family, health, retirement,
or other personal concerns. Appendix A shows typical 8-K reports with different categories
of resignation.
We document a negative and economically significant market reaction in the 3 days
around the resignation announcement, not only to the Disagreement category but also to
the more ambiguous and unverifiable categories of ‘‘No Reason’’ and ‘‘Outside
Commitments.’’ Furthermore, returns in the year prior to the ‘‘No Reason’’ and ‘‘Outside
Commitments’’ departure categories are negative and economically significant, as are
returns in the following year. A similar picture emerges when we examine past and future
operating performance surrounding these ambiguous departures, indicating weak operating
performance preceding as well as following these seemingly benign departure categories.
These results indicate that directors resign following and in anticipation of weak operating
performance and this result holds irrespective of the reason provided for the resignation.
The immediate negative market reaction to all categories and the negative market reaction
in the year following the resignation suggest that while investors are aware of the incen-
tives of directors to obfuscate the reason for departure when it involves concerns about
future profitability, investors, by and large, underreact to the resignation announcement,
likely because of the benign reason given for the resignation.
To provide additional insights, we classify the reasons cited for departures into two
groups based on the perceived reliability and verifiability of the reason cited (Hutton,
Miller, & Skinner, 2003; Mercer, 2004). The ‘‘verifiable’’ group includes Health,
Retirement age, Disagreement and Investigation departures, and a subset of Outside
Commitments and Personal reasons—only where details are explicitly revealed. The ‘‘non-
verifiable’’ group includes No Reason, voluntary Retirement, Outside Commitments, and
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Personal reasons where no additional information about outside activities and personal cir-
cumstances is disclosed, and hence the motive for the resignation is undefined and less
credible.
We find that resignations where an ambiguous or unverifiable reason is cited, or where
no reason is provided (i.e., the nonverifiable group), are preceded as well as followed by
poor financial and operating performance (equity returns, profitability, and cash flows in
the year preceding and following the resignation date). Furthermore, consistent with a view
that limited or no disclosure entails bad news (e.g., Grossman, 1981), we document nega-
tive abnormal returns around these resignation announcements that are both statistically
and economically significant, suggesting that independent directors’ resignations send a
negative signal to capital markets about future firm performance when the departure reason
is not verifiable. In contrast, market reaction and past and future financial and operating
performance are not different from zero when the director provides a verifiable and neutral
reason for departure.
Finally, we investigate whether and to what extent financial analysts—who are presum-
ably adept at information gathering and interpretation—are able to analyze the justification
provided and translate the implications of the departure into tangible forecasts. We find
negative analyst forecast revisions following ambiguous and unverifiable director depar-
tures. These findings provide additional support for our conjecture that some directors who
resign voluntarily do not cite the true reason for their departure when it is related to con-
cerns about future performance.3
To our knowledge, this article is the first to comprehensively and systematically exam-
ine the reasons cited for resignations by independent directors. The picture that emerges
from our analyses highlights limitations to the perceived advantages of appointing outside
‘‘independent’’ directors as monitors and advisers to management. Our results provide
additional evidence that notwithstanding the fiduciary duties toward shareholders, directors
may take actions to maximize their own utility at the expense of shareholders. We present
evidence that directors are likely to disguise the true reason for resignation whenever it is
related to concerns about future performance, thereby limiting shareholders’ ability to take
timely action following the resignation. Although departure reasons may not always be ade-
quately provided, investors appear to understand the independent directors’ reputational
concerns and accordingly react negatively (albeit, insufficiently) to such disclosures.
In what follows, ‘‘Literature Review and Hypotheses’’ section provides literature review
and the hypotheses, ‘‘Data and Descriptive Statistics’’ section describes the data, and
‘‘Results’’ section presents the results. The ‘‘Conclusions’’ section concludes.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
Director Resignations, Performance, and Reputation
When deciding whether to resign, directors trade off the benefits provided by the director-
ship position against the costs of continuing to serve on the board.4 Directorships provide
several important benefits: business relationships, acquiring reputation as an expert in deci-
sion control and monitoring—which in turn may help secure additional board appointments,
and compensation.5
Although directorships provide substantial benefits, they also entail direct costs in terms
of time commitment and effort; as well as indirect costs, foremost of which is reputation
risk (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014). Research suggests that a director’s reputation is directly
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affected by the performance of the firm. Individuals hold fewer directorships after serving
in companies that experience financial distress (Gilson, 1990), that perform poorly
(Yermack, 2004), that experience financial statement restatement, especially if the director
is a member of the audit committee (Srinivasan, 2005), and that are sued for financial
fraud (Brochet & Srinivasan, 2014; Fich & Shivdasani, 2007).6
As indicated, an outside director’s resignation signals that the costs associated with the
position have come to outweigh the benefits. One potential explanation for the increase in
costs is past underperformance. Directors of underperforming firms may resign to limit
potential damage to their reputation, evade legal liability, or escape the workload associated
with restructuring the firm’s operations.
Another explanation for the increase in costs is poor expected future financial perfor-
mance. The effect of past financial performance on reputation is essentially a sunk cost
because directors have already incurred the damage to their reputation. Unless the resigna-
tion is forced by shareholders, they have little incentive to resign if they believe the worst
is over. If the firm’s performance is expected to recover, then the impact of past perfor-
mance on reputation will be mitigated as the improvement occurs. However, even if the
firm did not underperform in the past but is expected to underperform in the future, direc-
tors still have an incentive to resign and thereby avoid potential reputation damage.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Asthana and Balsam (2009) find that independent directors
are more likely to resign when they expect the company to run into financial difficulties in
the future. Similarly, Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) find that firms where independent directors
resign unexpectedly have poor stock and accounting performance, are more likely to restate
earnings, and are more likely to be named in a federal class action securities fraud lawsuit
in the period subsequent to the resignation.
Although previous research findings suggest that firm performance affects directors’
reputation—and that directors are more likely to depart following weak operating perfor-
mance and when the firm is expected to underperform in the future—we conjecture that the
association between the likelihood of departure and future operating performance is moder-
ated by the extent of reputation risk. Specifically, directors with a higher reputation to con-
serve are more likely to depart when expecting (rather than following) weak operating
performance simply because the penalty in terms of their reputation is expected to be
greater. Hence, our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The likelihood of departure in anticipation of weak future perfor-
mance increases with reputation.
Information Content of Reasons for Departure, or Lack Thereof
One can broadly classify the reasons for departure into two categories—(a) resignations for
personal reasons not related to concerns about future performance, and (b) cases where the
director resigns because of concerns about future performance, perhaps to protect reputation
capital. The first category includes departures related to reasons such as health concerns,
the mandatory retirement age, and acceptance of a ministerial position or political candi-
dacy. This category covers resignation cases due to verifiable reasons and thus the likeli-
hood that these resignations are associated with concerns about future performance is low.
If directors resign due to concerns about future performance, they can signal their con-
cerns by disclosing this information as the reason for their resignation or by citing
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‘‘disagreement’’ with management, if any exists. This may be perceived as a warning
signal about future performance because of issues related to the operations or governance
of the firm. Indeed, Agrawal and Chen (2017) document a significant negative market reac-
tion to resignation announcements citing disagreement, and poor operating and stock per-
formance in the 12 months before and after the resignation. Dewally and Peck (2009)
report a significant number of bankruptcy cases, higher frequency of internal management
changes, and increased frequency of adoption of defense mechanisms against takeover fol-
lowing resignation citing disagreement.
However, often neither the director nor the company has an incentive to disclose the
true underlying reason for resignation if it entails concerns about future performance or
even disagreement with management—because that implies direct and indirect costs for the
company and the director, with no apparent benefit. Disclosing concerns about future per-
formance or disagreement is likely to trigger an economically significant negative market
reaction which would translate into a direct monetary loss for the departing director, man-
agement, and remaining directors through their equity ownership, in addition to shareholder
dissatisfaction. Furthermore, such resignation is likely to attract public scrutiny of the com-
pany, given the perception that directors may have access to information not available to
the public at large. Public scrutiny may be costly for management and the remaining direc-
tors for several reasons, especially if it is found that the director concerns or disagreement
had merit. These costs likely deter companies from disclosing that a resignation is related
to concerns about future performance or disagreement. Similarly, departing directors have
little incentive to cite concerns about future performance or disagreement with management
because the abovementioned costs are likely to undermine their relationship with the com-
pany and adversely affect their business dealings, as well as jeopardize their future director-
ship appointments (Marshall, 2010).7 Hence, if a departure is indeed prompted by concerns
about future performance, directors have an incentive to mask this by providing no reason
for the departure, or by providing vague notions such as ‘‘other commitments’’ and ‘‘for
personal reasons.’’ Importantly, it is difficult to prove that the director actually resigned for
reasons related to future performance. Taken together, the incentive not to disclose con-
cerns about future performance and the ability to effectively hide those concerns suggest
that directors are not likely to reveal the true reason for departure when it is motivated by
such concerns.
We examine the information content of the departure disclosure by analyzing the associ-
ation between the stated reason for the resignation and the reaction of investors and ana-
lysts to the announcement. We also examine the relation between subsequent firm
performance and the reasons for the departure. We posit that investor and analyst reaction
to the reported reason for resignation predictably depends on the extent to which the
reported reason is verifiable or reliable (Hutton et al., 2003; Mercer, 2004). Disagreement
and internal or external investigation against the director are two clear cases where the
reason itself conveys negative news, and moreover is unlikely to be misrepresented. Thus,
there is no tension in these cases and the expectation in both is that the market will respond
negatively to such resignations. This first category is dubbed ‘‘Verifiable-Negative.’’8 The
second category contains verifiable reasons that have no clear directional implications for
the future performance of the firm (labeled ‘‘Verifiable-Neutral’’). It includes resignation
for health reasons, mandatory retirement age, and a subset of Outside Commitments and
Personal reasons where details about these outside commitments and personal circum-
stances are expressly revealed and detailed. The third category, ‘‘Non-Verifiable,’’ includes
all resignation cases classified as No Reason. We also include in this category resignations
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citing Outside Commitments and Personal reasons where no additional information about
outside activities and personal circumstances are disclosed, rendering them vague or unde-
fined, and thus unverifiable and less credible. This third category potentially includes resig-
nations due to concerns about future performance that the director chose to mask by
providing an unverifiable reason for the departure. The discussion above leads to the fol-
lowing hypothesis (broken into two parts to facilitate analyses presentation):
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Investors react negatively to nonverifiable resignations.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Analysts react negatively to nonverifiable resignations.9
To the extent that a nonverifiable resignation provides a signal that the director poten-
tially has concerns about the future performance of the firm, the reaction by investors to
the resignation announcement is likely to be moderated by current operating performance
and the information environment of the firm. Nonverifiable resignations following poor
operating performance are more likely to be perceived as untruthful, and send a stronger
signal of weak future performance, than resignations following strong operating perfor-
mance. Hence, our hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Investor reactions to nonverifiable resignations depend on cur-
rent operating performance of the firm.
Similarly, the reaction also depends on the information environment. Because the source
of investor concern about the true reason for director departure is lack of information about
the true health and prospects of the firm, we expect the information environment of the
firm to be a moderating factor in the reaction of investors to resignation announcements.
Hence, our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Investor reactions to nonverifiable resignations depend on the
information environment of the firm.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We obtain data on resignations of independent directors from the Director and Officer
Change database of Audit Analytics starting in 2004 when disclosure of directors’ depar-
ture reasons became mandatory (SEC, 2004).
We apply several filters to the data to ensure that our sample is meaningful and to facili-
tate the empirical analyses. Firms are required to have valid Compustat and Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) information prior to the filing date, valid board and
director information from Boardex. In addition, we restrict the number of business days
between the announcement date (8-K filing date) and the effective date of departure to be
no more than 4 days, as the new SEC disclosure rule requires firms to disclose resignation
by officers of the firm not more than 4 working days after the event.10 We also exclude
departures related to M&A, spin-offs, bankruptcy, and restructuring because the reaction to
these departures could be attributed to the event itself. These restrictions result in a sample
of 5,647 filings by 2,916 firms from 2004 to 2012. Table 1, Panel A describes the data
restrictions and their effect on the total number of filings in our sample.
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Descriptive Statistics
Table 1, Panel B provides descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this study. We
compute announcement returns over the window encompassed by event days (24, 1),
where Day 0 is the filing date provided by Audit Analytics. We use Carhart’s (1997) four-
factor model to calculate benchmark returns and estimate model parameters over a 200-day
period from event day 2210 to event day 211. Our focus on an event window (from 24
to 1) is motivated by the possibility that there is potential information leakage from the
effective date of departure until the filing date and a wider window allows us to capture the
full impact of the event.11 Mean returns during the 6-day window encompassing the date of
Table 1. Summary Statistics.
Panel A: Sample Selection and Number of Filings Removed.
Starting sample 212,152
Filing year  2004 (4,288)
Valid Compustat and CRSP (89,001)
Exclude filings related to nonboard member (49,911)
Only independent director (6,525)
Only departure (43,840)
Valid board information from Boardex (9,597)
Departure due to M&A, Spin-off, bankruptcy, restructuring (3,293)
Effective date and filing date  4 business days (50)
Final sample 5,647
Panel B: Summary Statistics.
Performance measure M Median SD P25 P75
CAR[24,1] 20.47%*** 20.28% 10.94% 23.47% 2.94%
CAR[2360,25] 26.82%*** 23.24% 98.01% 250.16% 38.73%
CAR[2,360] 26.26%*** 21.65% 80.26% 243.89% 37.30%
Excess past profitability 26.55%*** 20.09% 30.02% 25.43% 3.42%
Excess future profitability 25.86%*** 20.10% 24.63% 25.58% 3.24%
Excess past cash flow 20.87%*** 0.09% 14.98% 23.96% 5.54%
Excess future cash flow 21.39%*** 0.20% 21.49% 23.92% 5.14%
Director characteristics
Tenure 8.92 6.67 7.66 3.50 11.92
Age 59.78 60.50 11.14 51.50 68.33
Independent directorship 0.61 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00
Board characteristics
D(CEO-chair) 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Board size 9.26 9.00 2.91 7.00 11.00
Firm characteristics
Analyst coverage 6.88 4.00 8.29 0.00 11.00
Firm age 18.85 13.00 16.34 8.00 25.00
D(Delaware) 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Total assets 4,331 725 12,115 169 2,593
ROA 21.82% 1.45% 16.48% 23.35% 6.42%
Note. Panel A tabulates sample losses due to data screening. Panel B provides sample statistics. *, **, and ***
denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%. CRSP = Center for Research in Security Prices; CAR =
cumulative abnormal return.
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the 8-K report are 20.47%, indicating a statistically and economically significant negative
market reaction to resignations of independent directors. Abnormal returns in the year prior
to the resignation are significantly negative, with a mean (median) of 26.82% (23.24%),
indicating that independent directors resign following subpar performance, consistent with
the evidence in Yermack (2004). Moreover, returns in the year following the resignation
are also significantly negative, with mean and median of 26.26% and 21.65%, respec-
tively. The negative returns in the year after the resignation support our conjecture that
independent directors may resign not only after but also in anticipation of poor future firm
performance. The operating performance of the sample firms is consistent with the negative
market returns; the mean industry-adjusted ROA and operating cash flows in the most
recent fiscal year ending before (after) the resignation date are significantly negative at
26.55% (25.86%) and 20.87% (21.39%), respectively.
Director characteristics indicate that the average age of the departing director is around
60 years, and average tenure on the board at the time of departure is approximately 9
years. The departing director holds on average 0.6 additional board seats (as an independent
director). Board characteristics indicate that the average board size is nine members,
including insiders. The CEO is the chairman of the board in approximately 46% of the
cases. The average firm age, measured as the number of years since the IPO, is 19 years,
with mean total assets of US$4,331 million. Average mean ROA is 21.82%. Finally, we
note that 60% of our sample firms are incorporated in the state of Delaware.12
Results
Likelihood of Departure
Before testing the hypothesis that the reasons for the departure provided by director are
suspect—primarily in cases where directors potentially resign to protect their reputation
capital—we first examine whether reputable directors are more likely to resign when they
foresee poor operating performance, consistent with an attempt to maintain their reputation
capital. We estimate the following model:
DepartureDummyi, y, t= a0+ a13Reputationi, y, t
+ a23Negative Past Performancey, t+ a33Negative
Future Performancey, t+1+ a43Reputationi, y, t3Negative Past Performancey, t
+ a53Reputationi, y, t3Negative Future Performancey, t
+Controlsy, t+Firm and Year Effects+ eit:
The model is estimated at the director-firm-year level conditional on resignation by at
least one independent director. Specifically, the observations include all the independent
directors of firm-years where at least one of the independent directors resigned in that par-
ticular year. The dependent variable is Departure Dummy, which takes the value of 1 if
director i of firm y resigned in year t, and zero otherwise. The independent variables
include proxies for reputation, negative future performance and negative past performance
indicators, an interaction variable of reputation with both future and past negative perfor-
mance indicators, and controls. We test whether directors with a high reputation are more
likely to resign when they foresee negative future performance based on the sign of a5
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(H1). Specifically, a positive and significant coefficient indicates that directors with a high
reputation are more likely to resign when they anticipate negative future performance.
We measure director reputation using three specifications: (a) the log of number of out-
side board positions held by the director, (b) an indicator with one if the director holds
more than one directorship, and (c) the average market capitalization of firms where the
director serves. Using the number of board seats as a proxy for reputation capital is consis-
tent with the extant literature on director reputation (e.g., Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard,
2003; Gilson, 1990; Yermack, 2004); directors who hold more than one directorship are
considered to have higher reputation capital. The directorships’ market capitalization speci-
fication captures their relative importance (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014). We cannot observe
directors’ expectations for future performance. However, because directors are privy to pri-
vate information, it is reasonable to assume that they are able, at a minimum, to foresee
whether the firm is likely to show positive or negative profitability in the coming period.
Hence, Negative_Performancet + 1 is measured by a loss indicator, D(Loss, t + 1), equal to
1 if ROA in the corresponding year is negative and zero otherwise. We similarly measure
D(Loss, t) as proxy for past (i.e., year of resignation) performance.
The control variables include other factors that are likely to be associated with the likeli-
hood of departure, the tenure of the director, and an indicator for age greater than 69 years
(chosen because many companies have a mandatory retirement at 70 years of age). We do
not include additional firm-level controls such as board size and market value of equity.
This is because the regressions are estimated at the director-firm-year level and hence
adding firm-level controls induces a high correlation across observations. Furthermore,
firm- and year-fixed effects are likely to capture yearly firm-level effects such as size. We
cluster the standard errors at the firm level to account for possible serial correlations.
Table 2, column 1 (column 2) shows the results where reputation is measured as an indi-
cator (continuous) variable based on the number of independent directorships and in
column 3 as the average market capitalization of boards where the director serves. The
coefficients on the reputation indicators is positive and marginally significant (p = .11) in
columns (1) and (2) and highly significant (p\ .01) in column (3), indicating that the like-
lihood of departure is positively associated with the reputation of directors—perhaps
because they have other board alternatives and consequently a lower relative cost of depar-
ture compared with directors who hold only one directorship position. More importantly,
the coefficient on the interaction variable of reputation and the negative future operating
performance indicator is positive and significant at 10% or better in all specifications, indi-
cating that the likelihood of departure given negative future operating performance
increases with reputation. This result provides support to the H1 that reputable directors are
more likely to resign when they foresee weak operating performance to protect their reputa-
tion capital.
Interestingly, in contrast to the findings in Yermack (2004), we find that the likelihood
of departure is not associated with past negative profitability, consistent with the conjecture
that the effect of past financial performance on reputation is essentially a sunk cost because
directors have already incurred the damage to their reputation. Reputable directors have
little incentive to resign if they believe the worst is over because subsequent improvement
in the firm’s performance is likely to mitigate the impact of past performance on
reputation.
The coefficients on the other control variables suggest that the likelihood of departure
increases with age and tenure. Taken together, the results indicate that the likelihood of
departures increases unconditionally with reputation and negative profitability. In addition,
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the results are consistent with the notion that director departures are at least partially moti-
vated by the preservation of reputational capital when poor firm performance is
anticipated.13
Performance and Reason for Departure
Table 3, Panel A tabulates the number of filings by departure reason and shows perfor-
mance statistics for each category of departure reason. There are 84 resignations resulting
from Disagreement with senior management and five cases stating that the director is under
investigation by internal or external parties (e.g., SEC). In 3,487 cases (61% of our sample)
Table 2. Likelihood of Departure and Director Reputation.
(1) (2) (3)
D(Leave) D(Leave) D(Leave)
D(outside directorship . 1) 0.079
(1.584)
D(outside directorship . 1) 3 D(Loss, t) 20.102
(21.187)
D(outside directorship . 1) 3 D(Loss, t + 1) 0.177
(2.032)**
Log number of outside directorship 0.081
(1.622)
Log number of outside directorship 3 D(Loss, t) 20.028
(20.306)
Log number of outside directorship 3 D(Loss, t + 1) 0.156
(1.772)*
Boards_MV 0.085
(3.127)***
Boards_MV 3 D(Loss, t) 20.029
(20.954)
Boards_MV 3 D(Loss, t + 1) 0.054
(1.658)*
D(Loss, t) 0.228 0.201 0.409
(3.416)*** (3.053)*** (2.110)**
D(Loss, t + 1) 0.074 0.085 20.131
(1.130) (1.320) (20.659)
Tenure 0.011 0.011 0.011
(4.273)*** (4.264)*** (4.109)***
D(Age . 69) 0.799 0.798 0.795
(14.834)*** (14.811)*** (14.798)***
Observations 99,795 99,795 99,795
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm
Note. The table reports results of an estimation of the likelihood of director departure given a measure of their
reputation and past and future firm performance. We include in the sample all independent directors of firm-years
where at least 1 year. The dependent variable, D(Leave), is an indicator with one if an independent director left
the board and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined under Appendix B. Constants are included but not
displayed. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at firm level. t statistics are
reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
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No Reason is provided for the resignation. In 694 cases, directors cite Outside
Commitments as the reason for departure; and, in 1,377 cases, directors indicate that the
departure is related to health, retirement, or personal reasons.14 The most striking statistics
are that zero occurrences of resignations cite concern over future performance, and the low
incidence of Disagreement cases (only about 1.6% of all departures). Although there is no
benchmark against which to test the number of resignations with disagreement, it appears
to be very low compared with the frequency of the other categories. Put differently, if
directors and firms are fully compliant and forthcoming with respect to disclosing the rea-
sons for departure, this statistic suggests that 98.4% of director resignations take place
when the director agrees with management on all matters ‘‘relating to the registrant’s oper-
ations, policies or practices’’ and concerns about future performance were in no way a con-
sideration in the departure.
Short window returns are negative and significant for Disagreement, Investigation, No
Reason, and Outside Commitments, suggesting that on average, the market views them all
as conveying negative news, regardless of the reason cited or lack thereof. At the same
time, when the stated reason for departure is Personal (i.e., health, personal reasons, or
retirement), the immediate market reaction is not significantly different from zero.
Examination of the preceding and following yearly abnormal returns indicates an aver-
age negative and significant return only for the potentially evasive No Reason and Outside
Commitments categories. However, excess past and future profitability are negative and
significant for all categories except Investigation and Personal; and excess past and future
cash flows are also negative and significant in two categories. Hence, except for the
Personal category, the results suggest that director resignations are significantly associated
with poor past and future operating performance regardless of the reasons for the departure,
providing additional support to the hypothesis that directors who resign because of con-
cerns about future performance may choose to mask the reason.
We further investigate the issue by partitioning the reasons for departure into two
groups based on how reliable and verifiable the reason is. In particular, Disagreement and
Investigation are two clear cases where the reason per se conveys negative news and is
unlikely to be misrepresented, so there is no tension in such cases. A director has no incen-
tive to report Disagreement when the resignation is not associated with disagreement. In
contrast, the No Reason category is classified as nonverifiable given the lack of information
about the reason for departure. To be able to classify the departures related to Outside
Commitments and Personal into the verifiable and nonverifiable categories, we supplement
the Audit Analytics database classifications by additional verification of the original Form
8-K where the resignation is announced. We classify departure due to Personal or Outside
Commitment as verifiable if details about personal or outside commitments are revealed.
For example, resignations attributed to Health are classified as verifiable because health is
less likely to be cited opportunistically as it reduces the likelihood of additional employ-
ment and is to a large extent verifiable. Retirement is classified as verifiable where the
director will be 69 or more in the year following the departure, and is otherwise considered
nonverifiable. Personal reasons (unless specific information is provided) are highly ambigu-
ous and may easily be used opportunistically. Outside Commitments are also ambiguous
and vague so we choose to classify these resignations as nonverifiable except for 11 cases
where the director clearly states that the Outside Commitment is related to political nomi-
nation or candidacy. In total, there are 1,272 (4,375) departure cases that are classified as
verifiable (nonverifiable). Because the verifiable cases include Disagreement and
Investigation categories—obvious negative news—whereas the remaining reasons for
Hava et al. 13
departure in this category such as Health or Personal reasons have no negative implication,
we further partition our verifiable group into Verifiable-Neutral and Verifiable-Negative.
Table 3, Panel B shows the performance statistics by verifiability category. The perfor-
mance metrics for the nonverifiable category are uniformly negative, indicating that non-
verifiable resignations are preceded and followed by negative operating performance as
well as negative stock returns (consistent with H2a). In contrast, the performance measures
are not significantly different from zero for the Verifiable-Neutral group, consistent with
the notion that such departures are not associated with past performance, nor do these
departures convey a negative signal about future performance. Comparing the performance
statistics across the Verifiable-Neutral and Non-Verifiable groups (difference between col-
umns 1 and 3), we find that the performance measures of the latter group are significantly
more negative, with two-tailed p values mostly less than 1%. Although verifiable,
Disagreement and Investigation are two clear cases where the reason per se conveys nega-
tive news (Verifiable-Negative) and the short-term announcement return is indeed signifi-
cantly negative at 22.3%. Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly, the Verifiable-Negative
group is not as uniformly or significantly negative as the Non-Verifiable group;
Disagreement and Investigation do not tend to be preceded nor followed by negative
annual abnormal returns, although past and future profitability is negative and significant
(cash flows are negative but not significant).
We further examine the association between the reason for departure and equity returns
around the announcement date and in the year following the resignation, using multivariate
regressions. To avoid the problem of full rank, we use Verifiable-Neutral departures (due
to Health, Retirement, or verifiable Personal and Outside Commitments) as the benchmark
group, because this category of resignations attracts no market reaction. The independent
variables include the resignation category dummies (Disagreement, No Reason, Outside
Commitments, and Personal). In addition, we include director indicators (age, tenure, com-
mittee membership), governance characteristics (CEO–chairman duality indicator, board
size, proportion of independent directors), and firm characteristics (size, profitability, age,
Delaware incorporation indicator, analysts coverage). We do not report the control vari-
ables for brevity. We cluster standard errors at the firm level to account for serial
correlations.
Column (1) of Table 4 provides results of the short-window announcement returns
regression. The results are entirely consistent with the univariate statistics. With the excep-
tion of the Personal category, the coefficients on the resignation categories are all negative
and significant indicating that irrespective of the reason or lack there-off for the resigna-
tion, investors seem to interpret resignations as a signal of bad news about the firm. The
coefficient on the Personal reasons category is negative but not different from zero.15 A
possible interpretation of this is that investors seem to give the benefit of the doubt in cases
where personal reasons are cited.
To examine whether the extent of the information’s creditability and verifiability are the
underlying characteristics associated with the differential market reaction, we present
Specification (3) in Table 4, where the resignation categories are determined by the verifia-
bility of the reason for the resignation. The coefficient on Verifiable-Negative indicator is
predictably negative and statistically significant. More importantly, the coefficient on
Nonverifiable resignation category is negative and significant. This result indicates that the
verifiability of the stated resignation reason is a fundamental determinant of market
reaction.
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Columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 replicate the regressions in columns (1) and (3) using
future 1-year abnormal returns as the dependent variable. These regressions examine
whether investors under- or overreact to the resignation announcement during the event
window. If investors did not over- or underreact during the event window then we should
observe that the coefficients on the resignation categories are not different from zero. With
respect to Specification (2), where stated categories are analyzed, results indicate that the
coefficients on the Disagreement and No Reason categories are not significantly different
from zero, implying that the negative market reaction to these categories during the event
window was, on average, accurate. However, the coefficient on the Outside Commitments
and Personal categories are negative and significant at 10% and 5%, respectively (two
tailed), indicating that investors seem to underreact to these categories of resignations
during the event window. Put differently, although departures for personal reasons do not
elicit an immediate negative response from the market, the future 1-year abnormal returns
suggest that such firms underperform the market. The results are consistent with the inter-
pretation that directors are not completely forthcoming about their departure reasons and
the market makes partial inferences from the stated reasons. Specification (4), where resig-
nations are classified based on verifiability, provides corroborating insights. It shows that
although the market reaction to nonverifiable resignation reasons generated a negative and
significant market reaction around the announcement date (column 3), there is still addi-
tional underperformance in the following year. These results support the hypothesis that
Table 4. Performance and Reason for Departure—Multivariate Analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR[24,1] CAR[2,360] CAR[24,1] CAR[2,360]
D(Disagreement/Investigation) 20.024 0.089
(22.293)** (0.965)
D(No reason) 20.012 20.038
(22.276)** (21.203)
D(Commitment) 20.014 20.075
(22.487)** (21.705)*
D(Personal) 20.004 20.127
(20.503) (21.989)**
D(Verifiable-Negative) 20.024 0.100
(22.276)** (1.061)
D(Nonverifiable) 20.012 20.057
(22.307)** (21.853)*
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,647 5,647 5,647 5,647
R2 .012 .012 .011 .021
Note. The table reports regression results of returns around the resignation date (columns 1, 3) and in the year
following the resignation (columns 2, 4) on the resignation categories and other controls. We include director
indicators (age, tenure, committee membership), governance characteristics (CEO–chairman duality indicator,
board size, proportion of independent directors), and firm characteristics (size, profitability, age, Delaware
incorporation indicator, analysts coverage) as control variables. We do not report the control variables for brevity.
All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at
firm level. Constants are included but not displayed. t statistics are reported in parentheses. Regressions include
year fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%. CAR = cumulative
abnormal return.
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verifiability of the information is the underlying factor in market response to resignations
and further suggest that the market underreacts to this information. Taken together, the
results indicate that while the market recognizes to some extent the incentives of directors
to obfuscate the reason for departure when it involves concerns about future performance,
the immediate reaction to the ‘‘Non-Verifiable’’ resignation cases is partial indicating that
directors are able to mask at least partially the true reason for the departure.
Reaction, Current Performance, and the Information Environment
Our next set of analyses further investigates the association between departure reasons and
short-window announcement returns while examining the mediating effects of concurrent
operating performance and the information environment. Investors are likely to respond
negatively to unverifiable departure reasons for fear that they signal poor future perfor-
mance; therefore, we hypothesize that departures announced during ‘‘good times’’ are less
likely to entail a negative market reaction even when the stated reason is less credible
(H3a). In H3b we also hypothesize that the reaction to the resignation categories depends
on the firm’s information environment. Because the source of investor concern about the
true reason for director departure is lack of information about the true prospects of
the firm, we expect the information environment of the firm to be a moderating factor in
the reaction of investors to resignation announcements.
We empirically examine the moderating impact of concurrent operating performance
and information environment by including interaction variables of the resignation cate-
gories with concurrent profitability and number of analysts following. To the extent that
these factors indeed moderate investors’ reaction, the coefficients on the interaction vari-
ables are expected to be positive.
Table 5 presents the regression results (as before coefficients on control variables are
suppressed). Columns (1) and (2) show the results including interaction terms for resigna-
tion categories and profitability. As reported in Table 4, with the exception of Personal rea-
sons, the coefficient on the resignation categories is negative and significant in
Specification (1). More importantly, with the same exception for Personal Reasons, the
coefficient on the interaction variables of the resignation categories with profitability are
all positive and significant in support of H3a, indicating that current operating performance
positively affects the market reaction to director departures, or in other words, mitigates the
negative reaction to the resignation announcement. Similarly, in Specification (2), the inter-
action of information environment proxy—the number of analysts following—with the
departure categories is positive for all categories, though significant only for the No
Reason and Personal categories, indicating that a better information environment reduces
the uncertainty associated with the signal related to the resignation and, therefore, mitigates
a negative investor reaction (in support of H3b). Columns (3) and (4) show results of analy-
ses using verifiability classification and draw similar conclusions; the coefficients on the
interaction variables of Nonverifiable with profitability and with analyst following are all
positive and significant indicating the moderating effect of information about contempora-
neous financial performance and information environment.
Analysts’ Reaction to Directors’ Departure
The results thus far indicate that investors react negatively to departures, and that the reac-
tion is more negative if the reason provided by the director is nonverifiable. In addition,
16 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
Table 5. Moderating Signals.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR[24,1] CAR[24,1] CAR[24,1] CAR[24,1]
D(Disagreement/Investigation) 20.021 20.030
(22.052)** (22.259)**
D(No reason) 20.010 20.020
(22.105)** (22.503)**
D(Commitment) 20.013 20.019
(22.328)** (22.236)**
D(Personal) 20.002 20.013
(20.263) (21.158)
D(Disagreement/Investigation) 3 Log ROA 0.045
(1.690)*
D(No reason) 3 Log ROA 0.040
(1.830)*
D(Commitment) 3 Log ROA 0.039
(1.849)*
D(Personal) 3 Log ROA 20.032
(20.571)
D(Disagreement/Investigation) 3 Analyst coverage 0.001
(0.755)
D(No reason) 3 Analyst coverage 0.001
(2.458)**
D(Commitment) 3 Analyst coverage 0.001
(1.351)
D(Personal) 3 Analyst coverage 0.001
(1.830)*
D(Verifiable-Negative) 20.021 20.030
(22.044)** (22.247)**
D(Nonverifiable) 20.010 20.019
(22.153)** (22.502)**
D(Verifiable-Negative) 3 Log ROA 0.045
(1.687)*
D(Nonverifiable) 3 Log ROA 0.039
(1.894)*
D(Verifiable-Negative) 3 Analyst coverage 0.001
(0.756)
D(Nonverifiable) 3 Analyst coverage 0.001
(2.420)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,647 5,647 5,647 5,647
R2 .015 .013 .014 .013
Note. The table reports regression results of returns around the resignation date on the resignation categories,
controlling for current period operating performance (columns 1, 3) and information environment (columns 2, 4).
We include director indicators (age, tenure, committee membership), governance characteristics (CEO–chairman
duality indicator, board size, proportion of independent directors), and firm characteristics (size, profitability, age,
Delaware incorporation indicator, analysts coverage) as control variables. We do not report the control variables
for brevity. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are
clustered at firm level. Constants are included but not displayed. t statistics are reported in parentheses.
Regressions include year fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
CAR = cumulative abnormal return; ROA = Return on Assets.
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the reaction is moderated by current operating performance and the information environ-
ment of the firm. In this subsection, we examine analysts’ reaction to director resignations
and the reason provided (H2b). Given that financial analysts are adept at information gath-
ering and interpretation, they understand the incentive of departing directors not to reveal
concerns about future performance and can potentially see through the opaque justifications
given for departure. Moreover, analysts are better equipped to assemble the pieces in the
mosaic of firm-related information and translate their implications into tangible forecasts.
Therefore, we explore the occurrence and direction of analyst forecast revisions following
director departures and their association with departure reasons.
One obstacle is the evidence in Rubin, Segal, and Segal (2017), which suggests analysts
tend not to react (by revising earnings forecast) to nonfinancial information such as director
resignations. In particular, they find that, on average, analysts react to only 38% of all non-
financial events reported on Form 8-K. Their results are puzzling because the low reaction
relates to nonfinancial events that trigger a significant market reaction. Nevertheless, the
authors provide evidence that analysts who react to nonfinancial information are more skill-
ful. We, therefore, focus on the group of analysts who react to resignation announcements.
As the analysis is conditional on the reaction, and resignation by directors represents
negative news, we expect a priori that the reaction is on average negative. However, if ana-
lysts take the reasons for resignation at face value then we expect variation in the likeli-
hood of reaction across categories and in the sign of the reaction. In particular, there
should be lower likelihood and less negative reaction to all categories in comparison with
the Disagreement category. Finding a similar frequency of reaction across categories—as
well as analysts revising forecasts downward regardless of the reason for departure—would
provide further evidence that market participants do not take the cited reason at face value.
Table 6, Panel A provides descriptive statistics. To be included in the sample we require
at least one forecast of current fiscal year earnings prior to the departure filing. Out of the
5,647 filings in our sample, 3,865 resignations are by directors of firms covered by IBES.
Of the 3,865 resignations, we identify 1,026 resignations (about 26%) that triggered a cur-
rent fiscal year earnings forecast revision by at least one analyst. We define ‘‘reaction’’ to
resignation if the forecast revision occurs between the event date and 6 calendar days after
the filing date.16 The relatively low reaction to departures is consistent with the findings in
Rubin et al. (2017), and it suggests that there is no analyst reaction for most resignation
cases. Looking across the resignation categories, we observe that the reaction to the benign
categories is similar to the sample average, yet the reaction to resignations citing disagree-
ment is only approximately 15% (eight out of 52 cases), with an average forecast revision
of 20.11.17 To the extent that analysts’ reaction to disagreements represents a benchmark
for reaction to resignations with a clear negative signal by the director regarding future per-
formance, the stronger reaction to supposedly benign resignations—for example, 144 out of
490 or 29% in the case of outside commitments, with an average forecast revision of
20.53—indicates that analysts do not take the cited reasons at face value.
Column (4) of Panel A shows that the average number of analysts following the firm is
around nine and is similar across the resignation categories. Column (5) shows the total
number of revisions for each category, and column (6) provides the proportion of analysts
who reacted to the news. For example, there were 52 resignation cases with disagreement
in firms covered by IBES. Of the 52 cases, eight cases (15%) elicited forecast revision by
at least one analyst. Interestingly, the proportion of resignations that resulted in forecast
revisions for the entire sample is much higher at 27% (1,026 revisions out of 3,865 resigna-
tions), as are the proportions for each of the other reason categories, ranging from 26% to
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29%. The number or proportion of analysts who reacted is another useful indicator. The
average number of analysts following the firms where disagreement was cited is 8.1, so the
maximum number of potential revisions in reaction to these eight cases is 64. However, the
total number of revisions amounted to 26, indicating that only 40% of the analysts covering
firms that reported resignation citing disagreement reacted. The proportion of analysts who
reacted to the news is an additional measure of the importance of the resignation event.
Resignation events with stronger implications for future earnings should elicit a greater
reaction frequency. Indeed, while the average proportion for the full sample is 31%, dis-
agreement cases elicit reactions by 40% of the analysts (column 6 of Panel A). However,
Outside Commitments elicit almost as high as a proportion of reactions (39%), and the
average proportion of reacting analysts to the other two categories is around 30%. Taken
together, these results indicate that resignations citing benign reasons are more likely to
generate forecast revisions than those citing disagreement (column 3 divided by column 2).
Moreover, the proportion of analysts who react to resignations with disagreement (column
6) is similar to that for Outside Commitments, though higher than the proportion of ana-
lysts who react to the Personal and No Reason categories.
Column (7) shows the average change in the forecast. We compute the change in the
forecast as the ratio of the change in the forecast (new forecast minus previous forecast) to
the absolute value of the previous forecast. A negative sign indicates downward revision.
Table 6. (continued)
Panel C: Regression analysis.
(1) (2)
Change in forecast Change in forecast
D(Disagreement/investigation) 0.104
(0.630)
D(No Reason) 20.162
(22.398)**
D(Commitment) 20.454
(23.183)***
D(Personal) 20.112
(21.659)*
D(Verifiable-Negative) 0.120
(0.707)
D(Nonverifiable) 20.199
(23.388)***
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 1,026 1,026
R2 .072 .064
Note. The table reports results of an analysis of analysts’ reaction to director resignation and the reason provided.
Analyst forecasts are from IBES. To be included in the revision sample, we require an analyst to have at least one
forecast prior to filing and one revision within 6 calendar days of filing, relating to the same fiscal year end. Panel A
tabulates sample statistics for the revision sample. The ‘‘Total’’ line provides the sum or the average of the statistic.
Panel B splits the sample statistics by verifiability of the stated departure reasons. Panel C reports regression
analysis by stated resignation reason (column 1) and verifiability (column 2). All other variables are defined in
Appendix B. Constants are included but not displayed. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and
are clustered at firm level t statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed significance level
at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
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On average, resignations elicit strong negative (222%) and statistically significant forecast
revision (p\ .01). We also observe a negative reaction across the various categories,
and the reaction is significant for the No Reason and Outside Commitments categories
(p\ .01). The reaction to the Disagreement category is marginally significant (two-tailed
p = .116), and the reaction to the Personal category, which includes many verifiable resig-
nations, is not statistically significant.
Table 6, Panel B shows the distribution of resignation cases that triggered forecast revi-
sion and the mean revision for the Verifiable-Neutral, Verifiable-Negative, and nonverifi-
able categories. The nonverifiable category includes all No Reason cases and all Outside
Commitments cases except for one verifiable case. Both are associated with a negative and
significant forecast revision. Of the 272 Personal cases in the sample, 37 are classified as
nonverifiable and 235 as verifiable. The Personal cases in the nonverifiable category are
associated with a negative though marginally significant reaction (two-tailed p = .115);
whereas the reaction to those cases in the verifiable category is, as expected, not signifi-
cantly different from zero. Overall, consistent with the reaction by investors and in support
of H2b, analysts do not take the reason cited, or lack thereof, at face value. Nonverifiable
departures send a negative signal to the market while Verifiable-Neutral departures (per-
sonal reasons such as retirement due to age or health issues) are not followed by a signifi-
cant change in the forecast.
Table 6, Panel C shows the results of a multivariate analysis where the dependent vari-
able is the average forecast revision for the resignation. The sample comprises resignations
that elicit at least one forecast revision. As before, the benchmark group consists of the
Verifiable-Neutral group. With the exception of Disagreement indicator, the coefficients on
all other resignation categories—namely, No Reason, Outside Commitments, and Personal
reasons—are negative and significant consistent with a negative interpretation of these
departures. One potential explanation for the nonsignificant coefficient for Disagreement is
the small number of resignations with disagreement in this subsample (only eight).
Specification (2) where resignations are classified based on verifiability yields similar
results where nonverifiable resignation reasons are significantly associated with downward
forecast revisions. Hence, these results indicate that nonverifiable reasons for resignations
are considered to be a negative signal for future performance.
Conclusion
In this study, we examine the information content of the reasons cited by independent
directors for resignation. Our main hypothesis is that directors have an incentive to disguise
the true reason for the resignation to the extent that it is related to concerns about future
performance of the firm. Citing such concerns or disagreement with management on any
issue related to the operation or policies of the firm comes at a significant cost to the direc-
tor and to the firm, due to the potentially adverse effect on the director’s equity holding,
business relations, and future directorship opportunities. This, together with the ability of
the director to effectively conceal the true reason for the departure, provides an incentive to
not reveal the true reason for the departure.
We find that the departure of independent directors elicits an immediate negative market
reaction and is associated with poor financial and operating performance in the year before
as well as the year after the resignation. However, these results hold only for cases where
there is ambiguity or difficulty in verifying the true motive for departure. Our results sup-
port the notion that investors and analysts are aware of the personal incentive for directors
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to distance themselves from a poorly performing firm, and thus regard the explanation for
the departure with suspicion. Nevertheless, we also observe negative equity returns in the
year after nonverifiable resignation, indicating that investors underreact to such resignation,
potentially because of the noninformative reason for the resignation.
Appendix A
Disagreement (Verifiable)
Pro-Pharmaceuticals Inc., 8-K, Date: September 15, 2006.
‘‘On September 12, 2006, we received a letter from David H. Smith, one of our directors,
notifying us of Mr. Smith’s resignation from the Board of Directors of Pro-
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. effective immediately. Mr. Smith was a member of our
Compensation Committee. In his letter, Mr. Smith indicated that his resignation was due to
differences on how the company has been and continues to be managed, including our
recent financing. A copy of Mr. Smith’s resignation letter is filed herewith as Exhibit 17.’’
No Reason (Nonverifiable)
Replidyne Inc., 8-K, Date: April 19, 2007.
‘‘Ralph E. Christoffersen, Ph.D., a member of the board of directors of the Company (the
‘‘Board’’) whose term will expire at the Company’s 2007 annual stockholder meeting (the
‘‘Annual Meeting’’), indicated to the Company on April 13, 2007 that he does not intend
to stand for re-election at the Annual Meeting. Dr. Christoffersen’s decision not to stand
for re-election is not due to any disagreement with the Company.’’
Outside Commitments (Verifiable)
Reebok International Ltd., 8-K, Date: April 24, 2005.
‘‘On April 24, 2005, because of the expected demands from his recently announced candi-
dacy for Governor of Massachusetts, Deval Patrick, one of the Company’s independent
directors, tendered his resignation as director. Mr. Patrick’s resignation was accepted on
April 28. The Company does not expect to fill the vacancy immediately and will remove
Mr. Patrick from the slate of directors to be elected at its upcoming Annual Meeting.’’
Outside Commitments (Nonverifiable)
American Medical Systems Holdings, Inc., 8-K, Date: March 21, 2006.
‘‘On March, 21, 2006, Douglas W. Kohrs, Chairman of the Board of Directors and a direc-
tor of American Medical Systems Holdings, Inc., notified the company that he would not
stand for re-election to the Board of Directors at the 2006 annual meeting of stockholders
and that he was resigning from the Board effective March 21, 2006 in order to devote his
full attention to a new business opportunity.’’
Personal (Verifiable)
Cintas Corporation, 8-K, Date: January 24, 2006.
‘‘Cintas Corporation Board member Robert J. Herbold resigned from the Board of
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Directors on January 24, 2006 because his wife has been appointed as U.S. Ambassador to
Singapore. Consequently, Mr. Herbold will be spending a significant amount of time in
Asia and unable to travel to Cincinnati on a regular basis to attend Cintas Board meetings.
The Nominating and Governance Committee is engaged in a search for an independent
director to replace Mr. Herbold.’’
Personal (Nonverifiable)
Alteon Inc/De, 8-K, Date: November 24, 2006.
‘‘On November 17, 2006, George M. Naimark, Ph.D., a member of the Board of Directors
of Alteon Inc. (the ‘‘Company’’), notified the Company of his decision to resign as a
Director, effective immediately, for personal reasons. The Company thanks Dr. Naimark
for his important contributions throughout the years.’’
Health (Verifiable)
Westmoreland Coal Co., 8-K, Date: January 12, 2006.
‘‘Pemberton Hutchinson, a member of the Westmoreland Coal Company Board of
Directors, has submitted his resignation effective January 6, 2006 for reasons related to his
health.’’
Retirement (Verifiable)
Gottschalks Inc., 8-K, Date: April 25, 2005.
‘‘Mr. Max Gutmann, age 82, has been a Director of the Company since 1992, and on April
19, 2005, informed the Company that he intends to resign from the Board of Directors
effective May 1, 2005. The Company is engaged in a search for a replacement who will,
among other things, meet the independence requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and The New York Stock Exchange.’’
Appendix B.
Variable Definition
Age Age of director.
Analyst coverage Number of analysts covering the firm in 1 year, where analyst
forecast information is from IBES.
Boards_MV Director reputation measure, average market capitalization of
firms where the director serves.
Board size Number of directors.
CAR[x,y] The cumulative abnormal return calculated over event window x
and y, where Day 0 is the filing date provided by Audit
Analytics. We use Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model to
calculate benchmark returns and estimate model parameters
over 200-day period prior to the event window.
(continued)
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Appendix B. (continued)
Variable Definition
Change in forecast The ratio of the change in the forecast (new forecast minus
previous forecast) to the absolute value of the previous
forecast.
D(age . 69 years) A dummy equal to one if the age of departing director is more
than 69 years.
D(CEO-chair) A dummy equal to one if CEO is also the chairman of the board
and zero otherwise.
D(Commitment) A dummy equal to one if the stated reason for departure is
related to outside commitment and zero otherwise.
D(Delaware) A dummy equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Delaware and
zero otherwise.
D(Disagreement/Investigation) A dummy equal to one if the stated reason for departure is
disagreement with management or under investigation and zero
otherwise.
D(Independent directorships) Director reputation measure, a dummy equal to one if number
of independent directorships is more than one.
D(Leave) A dummy equal to one if an independent director left the board
and zero otherwise.
D(Loss, t) A dummy equal to one if ROA is negative in the most recent
financial statement prior to departure.
D(Loss, t + 1) A dummy equal to one if ROA is negative in the year
immediately after the director departure filing.
D(No Reason) A dummy equal to one if the stated reason for departure is not
provided and zero otherwise.
D(Nonverifiable) A dummy equal to one if the stated reason for departure is not
verifiable and zero otherwise.
D(Personal) A dummy equal to one if the stated reason for departure is
personal reason and zero otherwise.
D(Verifiable-Negative) A dummy equal to one if the stated reason for departure is
verifiable and is related to disagreement with management or
under investigation and zero otherwise.
Excess past (future) cash flow The industry adjusted operating cash flows scaled by total assets
in the most recent fiscal year preceding (following) the 8-K
filing date. Industry adjusted variables are computed by
subtracting the median of the variable in the same Fama-French
48 industries in the same year.
Excess past (future) profitability The industry adjusted return on assets in the most recent fiscal
year preceding (following) the 8-K filing date. Industry adjusted
variables are computed by subtracting the median of the
variable in the same Fama-French 48 industries in the same
year.
Firm age The number of years from its first appearance on CRSP.
Independent directorships Director reputation measure, number of independent
directorships at other firms.
ROA Income before extraordinary items (Mnemonics ‘‘IB’’) over
lagged total assets (AT)
Tenure Number of years the director served on the board.
Note. AT = Assets Total; CRSP = Center for Research in Security Prices; CAR = cumulative abnormal return; IB =
Income Before Extraordinary Items; ROA = Return on Assets.
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Notes
1. ‘‘Resignation’’ and ‘‘departure’’ are used interchangeably to cover both resignation and refusal
to stand for reelection, consistent with the guidance of SEC Form 8-K, Item 5.02 (a)(1): ‘‘If a
director has resigned or refuses to stand for re-election to the board of directors.’’
2. We measure director reputation based on the number of boards and the market value of firms
where the director serves. See the ‘‘Results’’ section.
3. This is not to imply that all resignations relate to concerns about the future performance of the
firm. For example, some directors who cite time constraints may provide an honest description
of their reason for departure. We argue that among those who offer time constraints as a reason
for departure, there are cases where the departure is actually related to concerns about future
performance.
4. Our analysis focuses exclusively on the resignation of independent directors (also referred to as
outside directors). Inside directors are excluded because of the different incentives related to the
resignation decision and the reasons cited for departure. Because they are employed by the firm
and are typically part of senior management, inside directors have less incentive to resign as they
receive most of their compensation and prestige from the company. Moreover, the legal risks are
considerably higher for inside directors in their capacity as senior executives. In contrast, inde-
pendent directors are typically employed by other firms and hold other directorships, hence the
personal economic impact of resignation is smaller.
5. Yermack (2004) estimates that the average annual value of cash retainer and equity-related com-
pensation of directors of Fortune 500 companies is around US$70,000. Perry (2000) and Linn
and Park (2005) calculate that the value of the additional array of compensation in the form of
meeting fees, committee fees, insurance, and other fringe benefits increases the annual compen-
sation by one third.
6. Another potential indirect cost is the risk of litigation. However, Black et al. (2006) find that
incidences of out-of-pocket liability for independent directors are rare. Directors’ nominal liabil-
ity is almost entirely eliminated by a combination of indemnification, insurance, procedural
rules, and the settlement incentives of plaintiffs, defendants, and insurers.
7. Arguably, a resignation with disagreement may establish the reputation of the director as a more
vigilant monitor, as well as distancing the director from a poorly performing firm. However, this
may be achieved at the expense of future board appointments as CEOs may prefer less vigilant
directors (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006).
8. We note that while in the case of a departure with disagreement, the implications reflect nega-
tively on the firm, in the case of an investigation, against a director it reflects first and foremost
on the director herself/himself. Our sample contains only five cases of the latter and their exclu-
sion does not alter the results.
9. Note that while investors’ and analysts’ reaction to Verifiable-Negative resignations is expected
to be unambiguously negative, the reaction to Verifiable-Neutral resignations can be either nega-
tive (e.g., an effective director resigns due to appointment to a ministry position) or positive if
the departing director was not effective because of say age or health reasons (Hilary & Huang, in
press). Hence, we do not specify explicit hypotheses related to these two categories.
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10. Firms may file Form 8-K stating director’s future intention of departure, in which case the filing
date will predate the effective date of departure. Given the rare occurrence of such events (2.3%
of the sample), we further exclude these cases. Results are not affected by this criterion.
11. For example, Segal and Segal (2016) show that the timing of the formal 8-K filing within the
allowed 4-day window may be chosen strategically.
12. Because Delaware law may impose somewhat different (and arguably stricter) duties on directors
compared with other states (see, for example, Levi et al., 2017), and given its large representa-
tion in our sample, we control for Delaware incorporation state in all analyses except Table 2
where fixed-effects address this potential issue.
13. Another interpretation of the results is that departure by multiboard directors can cause poor
operating performance in subsequent periods because outside board membership is indicative of
more experience or skill (see, for example, Rubin & Segal, 2018). Although that reverse causal-
ity explanation is plausible, it cannot fully explain the results in our current study wherein we
see that director departures are also preceded by negative performance; having skilled and expe-
rienced directors on the board does not prevent poor operating performance.
14. Arguably there is not much difference between Outside Commitments and Personal. We opt to
treat them separately because of the large portion of cases where the director specifically indi-
cates ‘‘Outside Commitment’’ as the reason for departure.
15. In untabulated results, we look at alternative event windows (CAR[24,4], CAR[24,0], and
CAR[21,1]) and obtain similar results.
16. We also run the analysis using 3 days after the filing date as the cutoff. However, we note that 3
calendar days may cover as little as 1 business day, while more than 400 revisions occur between
Days 4 and 6 after the filing date. Given the limited sample size, we present the 6-day cutoff.
Results are similar when we use the 3-day cutoff.
17. We refer to Disagreement/Investigation category in Table 6 for consistency of presentation.
There are no cases of forecast revision related to investigation.
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